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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CHICAGO
CHARTER ACT OF 1907
1
By ERNsT FREuND.
I

While the proposed charter for the city of Chicago failed
to become a law, its potential existence during the summer
months of i9o7 secured it a place in the session laws of Illinois
of that year. It may be expected that in future attempts at charter legislation here or elsewhere- its provisions will be consulted.
In view of that contingency it may be useful to offer a few
comments upon some of the legal problems that presented themselves in drafting the 6harter, and the manner in which they
were dealt with.
It will be necessary to confine this comment to the main
features of the charter act, but the attention of students of the
municipal law of Chicago should be called to some minor provisions of legal interest; so to the recasting to the provisions of
the present city act on finance and expenditure (Article Ii),
which were intended to bring legal consistency into a branch of
our municipal law that would, as it now stands, be impracticable,
if it were strictly adhered to; also to the provisions for taking
care of defaulted improvement bonds which will be found in
Article 8, Section I5, and Article 15, Section 6 (see Chicago v..
These improvements upon the present
Brede, 218 Ill. 528).
sooner or later. Of other secondadopted
be
probably
law will
and remained more or less
contentious
ary matters that were
The question of comnotice:
deserve
two
unsettled, especially
intended to be placed
was
which
pensation for subsidewalk space,
beyond the controversy in which it is involved at present, and
'Prbfessor of Law in the Law School of the University of Chicago.
Professor Freund acted as" draftsman for the committee of the Chicago
Charter Convention, to which the working out of the convention's plan
was entrusted.-Ed.
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the provision for the carrying out of orders of the board
of health by the board and at the expense of the delinquent
owner, a provision which is in operation in England and in some
eastern cities, and which, in a carefully guarded form, deserves
to gain an entrance into the law of illinois (see Article 9, Section
i6). These matters were not vital parts of the charter scheme.
II
Comprehensive charter legislation was a new matter for the
present generation of the people of Illinois. Chicago, first incorporated under a general town corporation act of 1831, had
received its first city charter in 1837, a second complete charter
in 1851, and a third in 1863. The system of special charters
was abandoned when the city in 1875 adopted the general
Cities and Villages Act of 1872, at that time an adequate law
for the growing metropolis, which numbered about 4ooooo inhabitants. The Act of 1872 is said to have been drafted by Judge
Tuley, who was thoroughly conversant with the condition and the
needs of the city. Since 1872 there had been a very considerable
amount of legislation amending and adding to the Act of 1872the bulk of the law having been increased three or four foldbut the fundamental organization had on the whole been left
untouched. The introduction of civil service reform, the revision
of the Local Improvement Act, and a new regulation of, the
city's relation to the street railroads had been the most noteworthy changes. The system of enumerating the city's powers
in detail-characteristic of nearly all American municipal charters-inevitably resulted in lack of provision for newly developing
needs, and made it necessary to resort to the legislature for-additional powers, sometimes of a relatively trifling character. But
the chief difficulty of the city's government could not be reached
by ordinary legislation; the development of its financial resources
was hampered by constitutional limitations upon its borrowing
power. The organization of a number of distinct municipalities
on the same area, in part antedating the present constitution,
had to some extent modified the operation of these limitations,
but had on the other hand produced a serious lack of unity and
co6rdination in the functions of local government. It was nktural that an expansion of the bonding capacity of the city should
carry with it a reduction of the number of bond-issuing governing
bodies.
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The constitutional, amendment of 19o4 was framed to provide
a remedy for this condition of things; it allowed the consolidation
of all local governments the area of which is entirely within the
city limits (i. e., of the towns, the school board, and the park
governments, but excluding the county and the sanitary district,)
with the city government; and in the event of the city assuming
the indebtedness of at least two of the local governments so consolidated, it allowed' the raising of the debt limit from 5 per
cent of the assessed value (which is one-fifth of the full Yalue)
to 5 per cent of the full value of the taxable property of the city,
counting as part of such 5 per cent a proportionate part of the
debt of the county and the sanitary district. It also allowed special legislation for the city of Chicago, subject to a local referendum.
For the first time, since i87o, it thus became again possible
to enact a special charter for Chicago, and for the first time the
enactment of such a charter was made subject to specific constittitional limitations.
III
Home rule: In every city charter three classes of provisions
may be distinguished: (i) Those by which the legislature defines the local powers and determines at least the principal parts
of the local organization. They constitute the essential framework of the charter, and unless the constitution allows the inhabitants of the city to determine for themselves the scope and
constitution of the local government, they must be settled by
From .the legislature itself must also
legislative enactment.
even a very broad definition of the
which
emanate those powers,.
term "powers of local government" would not cover, such as the
power of eminent domain, especially outside of the city's own
territory, or-limitations of rights of action against the city. (SeeArticle 8, Section 6; Articld 8, Section io; Article 8, Section 12).
(2) Those provisions by which the state legislature imposes limitation upon local powers in order to enforce a distinct state policy
which is to be operative within the locality, or in order to prevent
an abuse of local powers and to secure protection to minority interests. (3) Detailed regulaiive provisions which might as well
be left to local self-government, but which will creep into every
statute through the legislative tendency to express with fullness
and particularity the substance of the matter which it happens
to have in hand.
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Since practically every provision of a charter, being a binding
state law, constitutes in the absence of saving clauses a limitation,
it follows that the volume of a charter is generally in inverse
proportion to the home rule which it bestows. A glance at the
charter of Greater New York will illustrate the truth of this
observation.
In Chicago there was a very general sentiment in favor
of broad powers of local gelf-government, and while limitations
of the second class above mentioned were of course inevitable,
in the main the securing of the desired grant of home rule presented as much a problem of drafting as of policy.
The framers of the charter had intended to break away
as far as. practicable from the system of minute specification of
powers. An examination of the charter act will show how far
this effort was attended with success. In the present law the
powers of the city council are enumerated in ninety-six separate
items. The charter grouped them under a small number of important heads forming distinct articles; officers, corporate powers,
police powers, finance, streets, public utilities, parks, schools,
etc. In each of these articles one broad provision was placed
giving the city control of the whole of the particular department
of municipal activity. In nearly every.case this meant a substantial enlargement of existing powers. No attempt was 'made to
define public utilities in order not to leave the city powerless in
the face of new industrial developments. Parks and driveways
were allowed to be located outside of as well as within the
city. The city's school powers would have covered every kind of
educational institution and facility. The powers for charity and
relief were 'almost entirely new. Even without the comprehensive clause of Article 5 the advance in home rule would have been
very considerable.
The object of this much discussed clause was to emphasize
the fundamental principle of the whole charter, which in the
words of the constitutional amendment was the creation of
a "complete system of local -municipal government." The bill
framed by the convention defined the powers of the city council
25-.
The city council shall be the governing body of the municipality.
It shall exercise the corporate powers of the city, and shall be vested
with powers of local legislation adequate to a complete system of local
municipal government subject to the general laws of the state, as by the
next following section provided.
The legislative powers of the city council shall be subject to the
provisions of this charter; but the specification of particular powers by
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as "covering all matters of local legislation and municipal government that can be constitutionally delegated to it by the legislature." This the legislature refused to grant, but granted instead
"powers of local legislation, adequate to a complete system of
local municipal government."
The difference, however, was one of language and not of
substance; both forms alike indicated that the city was to enjoy
the full extent of permissible delegation of powers, subject to
such limitations as the charter should expressly specify.

IV
The power of amendment': It was necessary for practical
reasons, in order to preserve continuity and to make such continuity appear on the face of the act, to incorporate into the charter a good deal of existing legislation with all its details just as
it stood on the statute books; while it would have been more in
this charter shall not be construed as impairing the general grant of
powers 'hereby bestowed except that no taxes shall be levied or imposed
by the city council other than as hereinafter provided.
5-2. The legislative power of the city council shall be further subject to all existing laws of the state not rendered inoperative by this
charter and to all general laws hereafter enacted by the general assembly
in conformity with and subject to the constitution, but no general statute
hereafer enacted relative to the government of the affairs of the cities
of the state, or of cities containing a stated number of inhabitants and
over, or. allowing the formation of new municipal corporations in any
part of the state, ,shall, in the absence of an express declaration of legislative intent to the contrary, be construed as applying to or. operative
within the city of Chicago.
5-3. The city council may provide for the carrying into effect of
any of its powers by the creation of an appropriate oificial organization
and by the delegation of adequate executive and administrative powers and
duties, subject to the provisions of this charter.
"5-4. Whenever this charter makes any provisions or regulations
with regard to a matter, the regulation of which the legislature has power
to delegate to the city council, the city council may adopt an ordinance
regulating such matter in whole or in part, and submit to the voters of
the city, in the manner provided for the submission of propositioni to
popular vote, the question whether the provisions of the charter (which
shall be designated in the ordinance by title, article, chapter, and sect on,
as the case may be) regulating such subject matter shall be discontiL aed
and the ordinance adopted by the city council be substituted in their stiad.
If the voters of the city shall vote in favor of such discontinuance 4nd
substitution, the provisions of the charter so designated shall from the..ceforth be inoperative within the city, and the ordinance so adopted
shall take effect. No ordinance amending or repealing 'such ordinance or
amending or repealing any ordinance that may subsequently be substituted
for it, shall go into effect until such ordinance shall have been approved
by a majority of the voters of the city voting upon the question.
This' section shall not apply to the provisions on taxation or to the
article on public utilities, or, to the provisions vesting the control of the
school system of the city in a board of education, or to any provisions
of this charter expressly prohibiting or restraining the exercise of particular powers by the city or any department or officer thereof.
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conformity with the spirit of the charter to state the main principles of those laws in broad outlines and to leave their elaboration to the city council.
A way had to be found to reconcile these many detailed
regulations with the principle of home rule. It was certain
that amendments would be called for from time to time, and
the question presented itself whether it would be possible to
avoid going to the legislature for every trifling change. It was
fully realized that a broad and unlimited power of amendment
lodged in the city council would be contrary to legislative intent
and most likely unconstitutional, but it was believed that a power
of amendment might find legislative and judicial approval, if it
were carefully circumscribed both as to subject matter and as
to mode of exercise.
For a provision vesting in a subordinate legislative body the
p6wer to change the law enacted by a superior body a direct
precedent was furnished by the charter of Greater New York.
This provides (Section 3) that certain sections shall be continued in force until the Board bf Aldermen shall pass ordinances
regulating the matters provided for in said sections, and when
the matter covered by any such section shall be regulated by
ordinance, the section shall cease to have any force and effect.
The Board of Aldermen is also given power to vary the building
laws (Section 65o). Louisiana also allows the charters of towns
to be amended, upon petition of one-third of the taxpayers, and
by an election held for that purpose (Laws of i88o, Chapter iio),
and South Carolina permitted in similar manner an extension of
the duration of city charters (Laws of i9o2, No. 562). In
Missouri an ordinance may supersede a statute, if the power
is clearly given (38 Mo. 451), and -the same is true under the
express terms of a recent city charter granted in Nevada (Laws
of i9o5, Chapter 7).
There has so far been no exhaustive judicial discussion of
the constitutionality of this practice. But the Supreme Court of
Michigan has declared a provision of the charter of Detroit
unconstitutional which allowed the charter to be amended, upon
recommendation of the mayor and by resolution of the common
council, or by petition of 5,ooo voters, the proposition to be submitted to the voters of the city.
The Court adopted the opinion of a lower court which laid
considerable stress upon the fact that legislative authority was
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delegated, not to the legislative branch of the city government,
but to its executive head, the mayor, or to any 5,ooo electors
(Elliott v. Detroit, 121 Mich. 6ii, 1894). However, the decision
stood as a warning to be cautious in the formulation of such
a grant of power.
No attempt was therefore made to vest in the city a general
power to amend the Charter Act, but the power was carefully
qualified in order to obviate, - if possible, any constitutional objection.
The qualifications were that the power of amendment was
limited to matters which in the first instance might have been
committed to the city council; that even as to those it was made
subject to important and far-reaching specific exceptions, and
that it was not to be effective without popular vote.
. The first qualification removed the objection of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. The exceptions related to those matters as to which it might fairly be inferred that
the legislature intended to impose a policy of its own upon the
city-the provisions on taxation, the article on public utilities,
the maintenance of a board of education to manage the school
system, and every provision expressly prohibiting or restraining
the exercise of particular powers by the city or any department
or officer thereof. The latter exception particularly indicated the
conservative and moderate character of the amending power.
The third qualification was in accordance with the spirit of
the constitutional amendment and would have left the final
decision upon the adoption of any amendment in the same
hands, whether the amendment had been proposed by Jhe council
or by the legislature. If this consideration had not been controlling, an optional referendum upon petition of a small percentage of voters would have been much preferable, as being less
unwieldy in operation and equally effective in securing popular
control.'
With the provision for a compulsory referendum there was
'In order to permit such improvements in the details of the local
improvement act not touching any matter of principle, as might be called
for from time to time, the following -provision was framed: (15-3.)
"The city council shall have the power by general ordinance passed
by a vote of three-fourths of all its members to make provisions regarding the time and manner of notice, regarding the number of installments
into which assessments may be divided, regarding the time of payment
of assessments and the payment of the interest upon the same, also regarding the form, the terms, and conditions of the payment of, improvement
bonds, and the provisions of any general local improvement act of the
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very little to distinguish the clause from those forms of local
option in which the legislature allows a municipality not only to
adopt or not to adopt some particular local scheme, but also to
discontinue its operation after having once adopted it. Under
the Illinois laws the power to establish and give up city courts
is perhaps the most conspicuous instance of this practice. Under
the constitutional amendment all special legislation for Chicago
is in effect local option legislation. With reference to those
charter provisions which were to be subject to the local power
of enactment, the legislature offered in the first instance some
regulation of its own which the city might, after having adopted
it, discontinue, and for the contingency of its discontinuance the
legislature offered a local power of regulation subject to a referendum; and it provided that the power to discontinue and the
power to regulate were to be exercised by one and the same act.
At most, then, there was a new combination of several features,
each of which was familiar to our legislative practice. It was
hoped that the form chosen would have stood the test of
judicial scrutiny. The power itself was so desirable that it would
have been unwise not to try the experiment.
Another question relating to charter amendments deserves
notice. Can a charter for the city of Chicago be changed
only in accordance with the express provisions of the constitutional amendment of [9o4 which requires submission to the
voters, or can future legislation enacted for all cities of the
state alike be made applicable also to the city of Chicago?
Perhaps a distinction ought to be made between legislation
which hegulates matters not covered by the charter, and legislation which is repugnant to charter provisions. General, legislation
of the former kind may be desirable; for instance, for the purpose
of introducing uniform methods of accounting. General legislation of the latter kind would in almost every case be contrary
to the spirit of the constitutional amendment, and the presumption should be against a legislative intent to that effect. Therefore,
while the question of power had to be left open, it was provided
as a rule of construction that in the future any law passed with
reference to cities should not apply to the City of Chicago, unless
the legislative intent to the contrary should be clearly expressed
(Article 22, Section i).
state upon any of these subjects shall be operative in the City of Chicago
only in the absence of any different provision upon the same subject made
under the power hereby granted."
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V
Consolidation: The provision of the constitutional amendment allowing only the consolidation of local governments with
jurisdiction confined to the territory of the City of Chicago made
it necessary to leave intact the organization of five townships
which extended partly into the city limits. It will also appear
from the first section of the dharter that the consolidation of the
other towns is qualified by the proviso "that towns or townships
shall be deemed to continue in existence only in so far as their
continued existence may be necessary to the collection of taxes."
The necessity of tIis proviso illustrates the incidental operation
of constitutional limitations. The town collector had for a long
time been an important figure in our revenue system. He survived when in 1898 the town assessors of Cook County were
abolished. In 19Ol when the township organization in large
cities was reduced to a mere shadow, the office of township
collector was not directly abrogated, but the treasurer was made
ex-officio township collector, and in that capacity collects the
local taxes at ,the present time. Had the charter undertaken to
abolish the* town organization outright, the county treasurer
could have acted no longer as ex-officio township collector; to
extend the functions of the county treasurer as such would have
been beyond the scope of charter legislation, and the creation of
a new city office for the collection of taxes would have brought
a new element into a revenue system already sufficiently intricate.
Hence it was deemed simplest to leave the towns in existence for
tax collecting purposes.
The express consolidation of the school government with the
city government would have removed a peculiar ambiguity, in
the relation between these two governmental organizations. The
constitution of 187o contains no positive provision for local divisions for educational purposes, but recognizes state, county,
township and district school officers. The district is also the
lowest unit for school purposes recognized by the general school
law. For Chicago the charter of 1837 had provided that the
common council might divide the city into school districts,
each of which was to elect annually three trustees with power
to purchase sites, etc. The charter of 1851 vested the title to
all school lands in the city, and gave to the city council general
powers over the school system. But the election of district
trustees was discontinued only in 1857, when provision was made
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for the appointment by the council of a Board of Education, the
duties of which were to be prescribed by ordinance. By the
charter of 1863 the powers of superintendence and control were
vested directly in the Board of Education, but the title to the
school lands continued in the city. The Cities and Villages Act
of 1872 was entirely silent as to schools, and when the City of
Chicago adopted it in 1875 its schools came to be governed by
the school law, which had special provisions for cities over
ioo,ooo. Such a city corresponded to and virtually constituted
a school district, but instead of elected directors it was to have
a Board of Education, which was to be appointed by the mayor,
but whose functions were prescribed by law, and were not to
be exercised by the common council, except as especially provided by law. The common council was to levy the school
taxes, and its concurrence was required for purchases and bond
issues. The title to school property continued to be vested in the
city, and as the city retained the financial powers and resources,
the money borrowed for school purposes was to be raised on
the credit of the city.
The resulting condition of law seems to be that the city corporation serves at the same time the purposes of a school district,
but that its powers in .that respect are derived from the school
law and not from the city law. Does it follow that there are two
separate and distinct corporations?
Perhaps somewhat inadvertently the Supreme Court expressed the relation in that form
in the case of Speight v. People, 87 Ill. 595, but the statement
was practically withdrawn in Brenan v. People, 176 Ill. 620,
when it was said that the Board of Education was not a municipal corporation and none the less a municipal agency or department of the city government, because certain corporate powers
are vested in it. Again, however, the Supreme Court spoke of
the Board of Education as a corporation or quasi-corporation
when it denied the liability of the city for neglect or default in
the construction of school buildings (Kinnare v. Chicago, 171 Ill.
332), but the decision was plainly and sufficiently founded upon
the generally recognized principle that there is no municipal
liability for default occurring in the discharge of public governmental duties.
The relation between the city and the school administration
remained sufficiently uncertain to furnish the present mayor some
slight color of legality when he undertook to remove members
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of the Board of Education, and it required another decision of
the Supreme Court to place this matter beyond controversy.
The adoption of the charter would have removed this ambiguity. The corporate identity of city and school organization
would have had the positive sanction of the constitution, and
the mayor's power of removal would have been regulated by
express provision. The city being placed to some extent under
a separate school law, a doubt would have arisen whether it
would have been entitled to a share in the so-called distributive
school fund, which by law is to be apportioned only among
schools kept in accordance with the general school law. A provision was therefore inserted in the charter to the effect that
"except as by this act modified, the provisions of the general
school law shall apply to the City of Chicago, and for the purpose
of sharing in the distribution of the common school fund and
other distributive funds, the schools of the city shall be deemed
to be kept in accordance with the provisions of said (the general
school) law."
VI
The provision for submission to popular vote: The constitutional amendment, after providing for the submission to the
voters of any "law based upon this amendment of the constitu-

tion, affecting the municipal government of the City of Chicago,"
adds, "and no local or special law based upon this amendment
affecting specially any part of the City of Chicago shall take
effect until consented to by a majority of the legal voters of such
part of said city voting on the question at any election, general,
municipal, or special."

Suppose the total vote cast in the city had shown a majority
in favor of the adoption of the charter, but the vote cast in
one town or in one park district had been adverse, what would

have been the effect under the clause last quoted?
It would most probably have been contended that the
amendment required a majority vote in each of the municipal
corporations sought to be consolidated, and in order to meet this

issue squarely the charter act provided that "in case any election
precinct of the city is or shall be intersected by the boundary
line of any of the municipal corporations sought to be consoli-

dated by this act, the judges of election shall procure and the
election commissioners shall furnish two or more ballot boxes
so as to allow the votes of the residents of such municipal cor-
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poration in such precinct to be received separately from the votes
of the voters of such precinct residing outside of such municipal
corporation, and the same shall be received and returned separately."
The force of the contention would have depended upon the
question whether the charter was a special or local law with reference to each local government which it undertook to abolish.
Suppose the constitution of a State forbids the enactment of
special laws granting or amending corporate charters, but all
previously existing corporate charters had been granted under
a reservation of a legislative power of amendment,-could, the
legislature of that state enact a general law affecting all corporaIt
tions alike, organized under special as well as general laws?
seems that such power must exist. Yet it cannot exist if the
general law is a special law with reference to each corporation
incorporated under a special charter which is affected by the
new law. The case thus put is parallel to the case of the town
or park district in Chicago. All towns and park districts are
in a sense similarly affected, for they are all equally consolidated
with the city. Concede, however, that each park district, having an organization and powers of its own, is specially -affected
by such consolidation, yet the constitutional amendment does not
require the special consent for every law affecting specially any
part of the city, but only for every local or special law affecting
specially such part. It does not appear how a law operative
throughout the whole city can, at the same time, be said to be
a local or special law, where the legislature contrasts the two
classes of laws.
If the -contention were well founded, the further question
would have arisen, and would arise in any future charter, how
the adverse vote in one town or park -district would affect
the adoption of the charter. The Charter Act left this to
judicial construction; however, an expression of legislative intent
would be controlling, and it would be appropriate. The effect
of an adverse vote in one of the small and obscure park districts
on the North Side should be at most to leave that district out of
the consolidation; an adverse vote of two of the large park systems, on the other hand, should carry with it the rejection of
the entire Act, since the increase of the bonding capacity of the
city-one of the main reasons for seeking a charter-is constitutionally conditioned upon the assumption of the debts of two of
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the corporations to be consolidated, which practically means two
of the large park systems. The doubt would *arise if only one of
the three park systems should reject the charter, and the reasons
for and against consolidation, leaving that one district out, would
be so closely balanced as to make an express legislative disposition
extremely desirable.
The idea that there should have been two separate votes in
each part of the city to be specially affected, one regarding
that part of the charter affecting that part, the other regarding
the remainder of the charter, was entirely inadmissible and impracticable, for it would have been as impossible for the legislature
to separate the consolidation from the other provisions as for the
voter to separate his judgment and vote; for the resident of Hyde
'Park to vote for the charter, but against consolidation of the
'South Park system, would have been to vote for an impracticable
and contradictory scheme.
Another idea should be briefly mentioned. The constitutional
amendment says: "The general assembly shall have power
to' pass any law (local, special, or general) providing a scheme
or charter," etc. The general law was understood by the framers
of the charter, to mean a law general with regard to all parts
of the city. Was this an error, and did the framers of tlhe
amendment mean a general law for the State or for all cities,
incidentally constituting also a charter for Chicago? If so, the
local and special law would be one relating to the City of ,Chicago
alone, and the charter would be such local and special law, and
in so far as it affected specially any park district would have
to be approved by the voters of that district. It would also
follow that-contrary to the assumption of Article 22, Section i,
of the Charter Act-no future general city legislation could have
affected the- city without its- consent. The fact that later on the"
constitutional amendment distinguishes between a law based upon
the amendment affecting the municipal government of Chicago,
and a local or special law based upon the amendment affecting
specially any part of the city, was taken to indicate that the
term "local or special" was thereby further defined; but it might,
of course, also be said that the words constitute a further differentiation of the term. At some time the Supreme Court may
have to solve this puzzle, for the question is very likely to arise
in future charter legislation.
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